Montclair State University

Montclair State University Digital
Commons
Department of Sociology Faculty Scholarship
and Creative Works

Department of Sociology

Fall 10-21-2013

Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant: The Dynamics of Land
Privatization in the Mekong Delta
Timothy Gorman
Montclair State University, gormant@montclair.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/sociology-facpubs
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Civic and Community Engagement
Commons, Community-Based Research Commons, Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons,
Land Use Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Other Law
Commons, Other Sociology Commons, Place and Environment Commons, Quantitative, Qualitative,
Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance
Commons, Sociology of Culture Commons, Theory, Knowledge and Science Commons, and the Work,
Economy and Organizations Commons

MSU Digital Commons Citation
Gorman, Timothy, "Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant: The Dynamics of Land Privatization in the
Mekong Delta" (2013). Department of Sociology Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works. 53.
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/sociology-facpubs/53

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Sociology at Montclair State University
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Sociology Faculty Scholarship and Creative
Works by an authorized administrator of Montclair State University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@montclair.edu.

bs_bs_banner

Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 14 No. 4, October 2014, pp. 501–521.

Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant:
The Dynamics of Land Privatization in
the Mekong Delta
TIMOTHY GORMAN

This paper examines how people mobilize around notions of distributive justice, or ‘moral
economies’, to make claims to resources, using the process of post-socialist land privatization in the Mekong Delta region of southern Vietnam as a case study. First, I argue that
the region’s history of settlement, production and political struggle helped to entrench
certain normative beliefs around landownership, most notably in its population of semicommercial upper peasants. I then detail the ways in which these upper peasants mobilized
around notions of distributive justice to successfully press demands for land restitution in
the late 1980s, drawing on Vietnamese newspapers and other sources to construct case
studies of local land conflicts. Finally, I argue that the successful mobilization of the upper
peasants around such a moral economy has helped, over the past two decades, to facilitate
the re-emergence of agrarian capitalism in the Mekong Delta, in contrast to other regions
in Vietnam.
Keywords: land reform, moral economy, social mobilization, post-socialism

INTRODUCTION
Over the summer and autumn of 1988, the Mekong Delta region of southern Vietnam was
rocked by protest and social conflict. In the face of post-socialist reforms that called for the
privatization of agricultural land tenure, relatively affluent farmers mobilized to demand the
restitution of lands that had been taken from them and redistributed to others after Vietnam’s
reunification in 1975. Across the region, these protestors engaged in land occupations, petition
drives and open demonstrations at local government offices, eventually culminating in two
marches on Ho Chi Minh City. In the end, this political mobilization by the Mekong Delta’s
upper stratum of emergent capitalist farmers succeeded in achieving a special settlement of
the land question, applicable only to that region, which allowed for the restitution of holdings
to their former owners, and in turn prompted the dispossession and displacement of thousands of rural poor.
This paper seeks to explain why and how the Mekong Delta’s upper peasantry was able to
successfully mobilize around deep-seated and widely-shared notions of economic and distributive justice, or what I call a ‘moral economy’, to press for the restitution of their former
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holdings.1 In the paper, I seek, first, to ground the development of this particular moral
economy in the history of settlement, production and political struggle in the Mekong Delta
and, second, to show how the articulation of this moral economy has shaped not just the
distribution of land, but the overall trajectory of economic and social development in the
region. In doing so, I aim to fill a gap in the existing literature, providing a bridge between
micro-level accounts of local politics and macro-level accounts of political and economic
change, both in the Mekong Delta and in Vietnam more broadly.
The Micropolitics of Agrarian Transition
Accounts of the micro-level, ‘everyday’ politics of agricultural production and land allocation
in northern Vietnam are relatively plentiful, with perhaps the most notable contribution being
Benedict Kerkvliet’s (2005) masterful account of peasant resistance to collective agriculture in
the Red River Delta. Peasant resistance, for Kerkvliet, is rooted in deeply held ‘sentiments’
on the part of the northern peasantry, who preferred family farming and individual ownership
to the collectives, and who expressed these preferences through uncoordinated and often
covert acts of sabotage, theft and foot-dragging, eventually bringing down the collective
system as whole. In a similar vein, those authors who have analysed the local politics of
decollectivization in northern Vietnam, such as Scott (2003), Sikor (2004) and Luong (2010),
have frequently described how peasants mobilized around notions of distributive equity to
affect the allocation of land to individual households. Hy Van Luong (2010, 194), for
example, recounts that a plan to allow better-off households in his Red River Delta study
village to bid on more productive land was abandoned ‘under pressure’ from local farmers,
who demanded ‘more equality’ in the allocation process, while Sikor (2004, 182) describes
how villagers in a north-western village pressured cadres to enact an egalitarian redistribution
more in keeping with their communitarian principles and traditional institutions.
Unfortunately, little work has been done on the local politics of land in southern Vietnam,
with the notable exception of Trung Dinh Dang’s recent PhD dissertation (2007), which
describes how farmers in Quang Nam and An Giang provinces resisted state attempts during
the late 1970s and early 1980s to reorganize production along socialist lines and redistribute
land to the rural poor. His account, from which I draw extensively in this paper, is remarkable
not just in that southerners resisted collectivization, but that they also resisted attempts to
enforce a more egalitarian distribution of land, in sharp contrast to their northern counterparts. For all of its worth, however, Dang’s dissertation is neither concerned with the origins
of this deeply rooted attachment to private property and antipathy to egalitarian redistribution, nor does he trace the ways in which it was manifested during the process of land
privatization in the late 1980s or in the two decades of rapid agricultural commercialization
that followed.
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, the Mekong Delta emerged as a major producer
of agricultural commodities for both export and domestic consumption, in sharp contrast to
the more subsistence-orientated forms of production that continue to predominate in northern and central Vietnam; in recent years, the Mekong Delta has produced more than half of
1

Throughout this paper, the term ‘upper peasantry’ is used to refer to a broad class of relatively well-to-do
farmers, encompassing both the ‘upper-middle peasant’ (trung nong tren) and ‘rich peasant’ (phu nong) strata. These
upper peasants owned larger-than-average plots of land, hired in labour (at least seasonally), and were engaged, at
least partially, in the production of crops for sale rather than direct consumption. These semi-commercial farmers
can be distinguished from the more subsistence-oriented lower-middle peasantry, the land-deficient poor
peasantry and the rural landless (Ngo Vinh Long 1984, 289–91; Race 2010, 92).
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Vietnam’s total rice crop, and contributed more than 90 per cent of rice exports (Nguyen
Duy Can et al. 2007, 72). While the rapid emergence of agrarian capitalism in the Mekong
Delta has caught the attention of, among others, Haroon Akram-Lodhi (2005), his account of
this process is curiously non-contextualized, fixating not on the region’s geography, economic
history or political culture – nor on ways in which these factors shaped struggles around how
resources would be allocated and production organized in the post-socialist period – but on
the impersonal workings of the market. Market reforms, Akram-Lodhi argues, have placed
‘great pressure’ on what was originally an ‘apparently equitable distribution of land’, leading
‘processes of social differentiation [to] assert themselves, and, perhaps, a form of “capitalism
from below” . . . to emerge’ (2005, 108). This analysis, however, fails to provide an explanation
as to why market forces would assert themselves more powerfully in the Mekong Delta than
elsewhere in Vietnam, or what exactly it is about the region that has made it such fertile
ground for the re-emergence of capitalist relations of production in agriculture.
This paper attempts to fill this analytical void through the use of moral economy as a
theoretical frame, looking to historical patterns of settlement, relations of production and
experiences of political struggle to explain how and why the Mekong Delta’s upper peasants
mobilized around a particular set of claims and ‘moral arguments’ during a key moment of
political opportunity in the late 1980s. In doing so, I argue, these protestors shaped both the
way in which land was eventually allocated and, ultimately, facilitated the rapid emergence of
a commercial agricultural sector in the post-reform period. In particular, I use the framework
of moral economy to bridge the gap between political agency and subjectivity at the microlevel and macro-level structural change, looking at the ways in which notions of distributive
justice take hold within certain historical and material conditions, how these normative
attachments foster collective political action and, ultimately, how they contribute to the
establishment, maintenance or upheaval of systems of property and production.
Organization of the Paper
In the next section of the paper, I briefly outline the concept of ‘moral economy’ before
surveying the modern history of the Mekong Delta, in the process tracing both the origins of
the upper peasantry and of this social formation’s distinct moral economy. In doing so, I pay
particular attention to the region’s geography, economy and history of political struggle over
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I argue that the Mekong Delta’s status
as an agricultural frontier, the particular relations of production that predominated in the
colonial and early republican periods, and the experience of political mobilization by both
insurgent and state actors during the mid-to-late twentieth century all helped to shape the
upper peasantry’s notions of distributive justice and the arguments through which they were
articulated.
In the third section, I address the theoretical concepts of grievance and political opportunity, linking these concepts to the moral economy framework. I first argue that the experience of land redistribution in the late 1970s and 1980s, after the reunification of Vietnam
under socialist control, sharply deviated from the ‘ideal’ distribution of resources, as held by
the Mekong Delta’s upper-middle and rich peasants. Second, I discuss the shifting opportunity structure that characterized the Vietnamese political system in the late 1980s, arguing that
leadership changes at the upper echelons of the communist party, a food crisis in northern
Vietnam and an ambiguous policy environment created a uniquely advantageous moment in
which relatively well-off farmers could press their land claims and seek the redress of their
perceived grievance.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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In the fourth section, I discuss the protests that rocked the Mekong Delta during the late
1980s, drawing on contemporary Vietnamese newspapers and other secondary sources to
construct a series of detailed case studies of local land conflicts. Through these case studies, I
identify the key ways in which the moral economy of the region’s upper peasantry and its
attendant notions of distributive justice were articulated in the context of social conflict. In
particular, I discuss the ways in which notions of settlement and the frontier, appeals to
productive capacity and histories of revolutionary service were used to make land claims, both
against the rural poor and against representatives of the local and national state.
In the fifth and final section, I describe the resolution of these land conflicts and the
enduring legacy of the moral economy around which they were articulated. I argue that the
mobilization of the Mekong Delta’s upper peasantry around this particular moral economy
helped to shape the distribution of land and other productive resources in a way that
favoured the rapid development of commercial agriculture in the region. This trajectory of
post-reform development stands in sharp contrast to that of other agricultural regions in
Vietnam, where a more deeply entrenched egalitarianism has slowed commercialization and
accumulation.
Note on Sources
Any attempt to tell the story of local land conflicts in Vietnam, especially those to which one
was not a direct witness, is limited by the scope and biases of available sources. As with
Kerkvliet’s study (2005) in the Red River Delta, I have attempted to reconstruct the political
struggles over land that took place in the Mekong Delta during the late 1980s using contemporary newspaper accounts, in particular those of the Ho Chi Minh City–based Tuoi Tre and
Thanh Nien. Despite a relative flourishing of Press freedom in the late 1980s, all newspapers
were (and remain) affiliated with the Vietnamese Communist Party or one of its subsidiary
organizations, and thus tend to provide accounts favourable to the party and its policies. Given
the ambiguity as to what exactly the ‘party line’ was regarding peasant land claims during the
period of study, and the relative freedom with which such metropolitan newspapers criticized
local and provincial officials, these tendencies do not, thankfully, prevent the available accounts
from presenting a relatively informative – and non-propagandistic – account of local land
disputes in the Mekong Delta. More serious as a methodological constraint, however, is the
tendency of such sources to present the viewpoints of both land claimants and local officials
at length, while not providing a similar treatment to those poor peasants who were threatened
with the loss of their land. While I have, in the course of my research, recovered enough
material to provide an adequate treatment of the upper-peasant protestors, my treatment of
the rural poor, and of the way in which they either contested or acceded to the claims of
aggrieved landowners, is much more tenuous, and is limited by the narrow scope of available
secondary research.
MORAL ECONOMY AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE MEKONG DELTA
As used here, moral economy is not a theory unto itself, but is instead embedded within a
larger Marxian and materialist approach to political economy. Marx (1859) himself performed
some of the earliest enquiry into political subjectivities and their relation to modes of
production, famously arguing that ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness’. While such a phrasing implies that consciousness is merely an outgrowth of objective class position, his detailed
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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investigation into the political subjectivities of French peasants, as contained within The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852), reveals a more nuanced appreciation for the
specificity of historical context in shaping such subjectivities: the political orientation of
the French peasantry, he argues, cannot simply be deduced from the contemporary class
structure, but is instead conditioned by a submerged layer of custom and culture, by the
‘traditions of all dead generations’, which weigh ‘like a nightmare on the brains of the living’.
Picking up where Marx left off, E.P. Thompson’s case study of bread riots in early modern
England, contained within his 1971 essay on ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in
the Eighteenth Century’ and revisited in his book Customs in Common (1993), takes as its
object of enquiry the political culture of the English working class, including its ‘expectations’, ‘traditions’ and even its ‘superstitions’ (1993, 260). What Thompson finds is that the
bread riots of the eighteenth century formed a ‘pattern of social protest which derives from a
consensus as to the moral economy of the commonwealth’ (1971, 126): this ‘moral economy’,
he argues, can be traced to an assemblage of beliefs, customs, norms and practices around
issues of distribution and surplus extraction, rooted in the history of pre-capitalist England
and expectations of inter-class reciprocity.
Building on Thompson’s contribution, I argue below that the particular moral economy of
the Mekong Delta’s emergent class of semi-commercial upper peasants was conditioned by
three factors: first, by the particularities of the region’s geography and patterns of settlement
and, in particular, by the existence and persistence of an agricultural frontier; second, by the
tenancy-based relations of agricultural production established under French colonial rule and
perpetuated under the government of South Vietnam after independence and partition in
1954; and, third, the experience of revolutionary struggle and political mobilization during
the military conflicts of the late twentieth century.
Geographies of Settlement and Cultivation
Until the seventeenth century, the Mekong Delta was a region of swamps, forests and inundated grasslands inhabited mostly by ethnic Khmer and politically integrated into the Cambodian kingdom. Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the
Khmer were progressively displaced by ethnic Vietnamese settlers from the north, culminating
in the assertion of Vietnamese sovereignty over the region in 1802. This claim to sovereignty
was in turn rooted in and justified by the application of labour in clearing and cultivating the
‘wild lands’ (dat hoang) of the delta. In Vietnamese historiography, the conquest of the delta
has been viewed as the ‘breaking’ of ‘fresh ground’ (khan hoang), implying that the ‘land was
unused and therefore available’, and ‘that hard work was needed to make the land viable
before ownership could be conferred’ (Ang forthcoming).
The settler society that sprung up along the frontier, however, differed significantly from
that of the Vietnamese homeland to the north. While the villages of northern and central
Vietnam, where land was scarce and no equivalent agricultural frontier existed, had long
managed such scarcity by designating large swathes of cong dien, or communal land, for
periodic redistribution to the landless, this pattern was not replicated in the Mekong Delta.2
Nor, for that matter, did villagers in the Mekong Delta cluster in closed, corporate villagers, as

2

Pierre Gourou (1955, 385), writing in the early 1930s, puts the figure for communal land at about 20 per
cent of total land area in the Red River Delta, while Hickey (1964, 42), citing French colonial sources, puts that
figure at only 3 per cent for southern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta.
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did their counterparts in the north, but instead dispersed into more atomized settlements,
usually strung along waterways (Rambo 1973). Such differences in the mode of settlement
and land allocation led to the emergence of a very different concept of property in the
Mekong Delta: while villagers in the north gained access to land (as common patrimony)
through membership in a village community, their counterparts in the Mekong Delta were
not granted land, but settled and cleared it themselves, and thus their right to access and use
was rooted in the application of labour.
With the establishment, in 1862, of French colonial rule over southern Vietnam came a
massive extension of canals and other forms of infrastructure in the Mekong Delta, all with
the aim of opening up the region for rice cultivation. To encourage the rapid conversion of
existing land to export agriculture, the French also established a concession system that
allowed for large land grants to elites, both Vietnamese and European. These individuals,
however, did ‘not go out and do the actual hard work of clearing the land’ themselves;
instead, the ‘commonest pattern of acquiring land for the relatively well-to-do and powerful
was to take it away from those who were unable to defend their own’ (Gran 1975, 266–7).
Taking advantage of a judicial system heavily weighted towards elite interests, they would
simply file a claim to land that had been cleared, but whose settlers, largely illiterate and
ignorant of the workings of French law, possessed no legal title.
Rather than submit to such dispossession and accept the burdens of tenancy, settlers would
often move further out along the agricultural frontier, to the southern and western reaches of
the delta, where unsettled and unregistered land existed into the 1940s (Gran 1975, 314).
Here as well, however, they fell prey to land speculators and rent-seeking elites. A common
practice was for speculators to pick out an uncleared area, file a demand for concession with
the local courts and simply wait for settlers to come, clear the land and bring it under
cultivation before acting on such claims (Gran 1975, 314).
Relations of Production
Given the concept’s lineage in Marxian political economy, the development and articulation
of a particular moral economy only makes sense when situated, to use the phrasing of Robert
Brenner (1976, 31), within the historical ‘social–property relations’ by which ‘a part of the
product is extracted from the direct producers by a class of non-producers’. As theorized by
Wendy Wolford (2005, 243) in her work on agrarian social mobilization and competing
claims to land among Brazilian agriculturalists, moral economy thus consists of ‘moral arguments’, constituted through ‘historically and culturally specific production relations’ and ‘used
by a particular group of people to define the optimal organization of society, including most
importantly an outline of how society’s productive resources (in this case, land) ought to be
divided’.
In the colonial Mekong Delta, a capitalist mode of agricultural production was built
around social–property relations that severed the vast majority of the Mekong Delta’s population from ownership over the means of production, compelling them to enter into exploitative relations of tenancy or wage labour. A 1930–1 survey conducted by colonial officials
(Murray 1980, 429–39) depicts this highly fractured social landscape: on one hand, landless
tenant farmers comprised about 75 per cent of households in the Mekong Delta, while a
‘floating surplus population’ of landless labourers circulated about the countryside according
to the rhythms of the agricultural calendar. Meanwhile, a tiny minority of landlords (about 2
per cent of the population) owned the vast majority of the agricultural land area, while a
small class of independent peasant producers tilled the remainder.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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In the words of Jeffrey Paige (1975, 319), the colonial capitalism of the Mekong Delta thus
served to create ‘a stark two-class system in which peasant labour created the only form of
wealth and landlords simply confiscated this wealth in the form of rent’. The power of the
landlord class and their exploitation of the tenants were compounded by the fact that tenants
also frequently rented the non-land means of production from landlords (Murray 1980,
433–4) and went into debt as a result, ultimately allowing the landlords to capture an even
greater proportion of the agricultural surplus than through mere rents alone. Rendered
dependent on landlords for access to the means of subsistence and social reproduction, the
political demands of the tenant class came to fixate on the recovery of land rights, prompting
a constant stream of disputes, and even outright violence, between settler–tenants and concessionaire landlords.
Neither rooted in a long-standing history of paternalistic social relations nor constitutive of
anything more than naked exploitation and surplus extraction, the tenancy system of the
colonial Mekong Delta was subjected to near-constant resistance from below. Notable
examples of such resistance include the Ninh Thanh Loi uprising of 1927, which united
dispossessed Khmer and Vietnamese farmers in an attack against local concessionaries
(Brocheux 1995, 40; Biggs 2010, 100–2), and a series of uprisings and land occupations in the
early 1930s (Scott 1976, 126–7; Murray 1980, 465). Such resistance both grew out of and
helped to crystallize an emergent moral economy, set in contradistinction to French colonial
law and the social–property system it enabled, which articulated a moral argument to property based on the application of labour in its clearance, settlement and cultivation. Land, as a
contemporary Vietnamese proverb put it, should rightly belong to he ‘who rubs it between
his hands each season’ (Pike 1966, 276).
Articulation in Resistance
It is in moments of resistance and political mobilization that the ‘the outlines of a given moral
economy are most easily visible’ (Wolford 2005, 243). The act or process of resistance thus
serves to solidify or concretize a moral economy, bringing the unspoken assumptions of a
normative order into the realm of political discourse. This is precisely what happened in the
Mekong Delta over the tumultuous decades between the onset of the First Indochina War in
1945 and the conclusion of the Second Indochina War (the ‘Vietnam War’) in 1975, as the
region’s tenants became a target for mobilization by political entrepreneurs in both revolutionary movements (namely the Viet Minh and the National Liberation Front) and, in the
early 1970s, the government of South Vietnam. In doing so, both sides adapted their ideological messages to the local, socially situated moral economy of the tenant, promising to redress
the historical grievance of dispossession through land reforms.
During the 1945–54 struggle against the French, the communist-led Viet Minh positioned
itself as the protector of the tenants’ property claims against the underhanded and acquisitive
landlord class, rather than calling for egalitarian redistribution (Elliott 2007, 33). Where the
Viet Minh was able to achieve political control, it distributed land from absentee landlords
and pro-French collaborators to tenant farmers, transforming the beneficiaries into newly
landed farmers (Elliott 2007, 67–9). These reforms were reversed with the creation of an
independent South Vietnamese state in 1954, but with the re-emergence in the early 1960s of
a communist insurgency, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF), land claims again took
centre stage. In territories under its control, the NLF implemented ‘land to the tiller’ (nguoi
cay co ruong) reforms that transformed former tenants into ‘de facto owners of the land they
worked’ (Paige 1975, 317), allowing tenants a means by which to ascend to the ranks of the
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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landed middle and upper-middle peasantry. Since the rented plots of tenants varied in size,
however, these reforms had the effect not of erasing social differences in the countryside but
of cementing them (Wiegersma 1988, 191).
Initially hostile to NLF land reforms, the government of South Vietnam changed course in
1970, launching a ‘land to the tiller’ reform of its own, with the guidance of its American
advisors. By 1973, over one million households in southern Vietnam and the Mekong
Delta had received landownership rights, transforming them from tenants to landowners
(Prosterman and Riedinger 1987, 139). While aimed immediately at weakening support for
the NLF, these reforms had the long-term aim both of creating a new class of ‘entrepreneurial
small farmers’ who ‘embraced liberal ideas of political and economic freedom’ and of deepening ‘capitalist relations’ in agriculture (Porter 1993, 28, 60).3 Significantly, these land reforms
went hand in hand with the introduction of Green Revolution technologies, such as
mechanical inputs, fertilizers, pesticides and high-yielding varieties of ‘miracle rice’ (Callison
1983).
The combined effect of political mobilization by both revolutionary and state actors was
thus to entrench a particular set of subjective attachments and claims to agricultural land,
while at the same time creating, from the ranks of the former tenants, a new class of farmers
who were deeply enmeshed in capitalist relations of agricultural production; these new uppermiddle and rich peasants, who displaced the landlords as the upper social stratum in the rural
Mekong Delta, were engaged in at least semi-commercial agriculture, producing more than
enough to satisfy their subsistence needs and marketing the surplus, and most hired in labour,
at least seasonally (Callison 1983, 119; Ngo Vinh Long 1984, 289; Quang Truong 1987, 215;
Lam Quang Huyen 1997, 173). Many also owned substantial stocks of non-land capital, such
as tractors, harvesters and pumps, which were both used on-farm and hired out to lowermiddle and poor peasant cultivators (Ngo Vinh Long 1984). The dominance of this group of
new, upwardly mobile capitalist farmers posed a distinct challenge to the post-war authorities
in Hanoi, who sought to integrate the newly ‘liberated’ south into an economic and political
system dominated by the egalitarian and collective ideology of the Communist Party, itself
largely the product of the cultural and historical context of northern and central Vietnam.
GRIEVANCE AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Moral economy, as it has been presented here, provides the subjective basis (derived from
material histories of settlement, production and political struggle) around which a group may
mobilize and make claims to resources. Such mobilization, however, requires both an impetus
– a grievance that may be framed in a manner consonant with an existing set of values or
principles and whose redress requires collective action – as well as a moment of political
opportunity in which such action may plausibly succeed (Tarrow 1998). These dynamics are
clearly on display in the post-war Mekong Delta, as the region’s new landowners found
themselves the targets of redistributive reforms that sought to equalize landholdings and
collectivize production. This new policy, resting as it did on egalitarian principles alien to the
moral economy of the delta’s upper peasantry, lit a flame of resentment that smouldered into
the 1980s. It was only, however, with the political and economic shifts of the late 1980s that
this flame erupted into a conflagration of social unrest.
3

More bluntly, Ngo Vinh Long (1984, 300) asserts that the goal of such reforms was to create ‘a class of kulaks
in rural South Vietnam’, which would then provide a base of support for the anti-communist government in
Saigon.
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Grievance
The notion of grievance has a long history in the study of political mobilization, but it is
James Scott’s (1976) study of peasant rebellions in South-East Asia that first employs the
concept in relation to the moral economy. In Scott’s conceptualization, peasants in colonial
South-East Asia engaged in open rebellion only when a certain moral threshold was crossed,
or when the features of an actually existing political, economic or social system strayed too far
from the ideal conception of a just distribution of assets, resources and opportunities, or what
he calls the peasant’s ‘notion of economic justice’ (Scott 1976, 3). While Scott’s ‘moral
economy of the peasant’ is a distinct form, one that emphasizes notions of distributive equity
and subsistence security rather than claims to land as inviolable private property, his formulation bears considerable relevance to the case at hand.
In this case, the grievance that sparked land protests in the late 1980s can be traced to the
redistributive policies pursued by Vietnam’s communist leadership after reunification in 1975.
In the aftermath of reunification, the Mekong Delta was still a region of stark inequalities.
Nearly a quarter of the rural population was comprised of poor peasants and landless labourers; these lower classes had either not qualified for redistribution under the ‘land to the tillers’
scheme or had received small plots insufficient to meet household needs (Ngo Vinh Long
1984, 289).
Shortly after establishing control over the region, the Hanoi government launched a new
wave of land reforms – dubbed ‘readjustments’, or dieu chinh in Vietnamese – aimed at
eliminating ‘vestiges of feudalism’ and ‘exploitation on the land’ (Dang 2007, 118). In practice,
what this round of readjustment entailed was the confiscation of land from landlords, former
allies of the Saigon regime, and from those who had fled abroad, as well as from churches and
temples (Lam Quang Huyen 1997, 172). The limited nature of this reform, however, meant
that there continued to exist a significant class of poor and landless peasants, whose dire lot
contrasted sharply with the relatively prosperous condition of the upper peasants.
To redress these inequalities, the central government began a second wave of reforms in
1982, the aim of which was to force upper-middle and rich peasant households to ‘cede back
that quantity of land which exceeds their household labour capacity’ (Vu Oanh 1984, 29) for
redistribution to the poor and landless. In total, more than 500,000 hectares were redistributed
between 1976 and 1985, or about 25 per cent of the total agricultural area in the Mekong
Delta (Dang 2007, 252). According to Lam Quang Huyen (1997, 174), some 30 per cent of
rural households in the region were forced to surrender land in this period, while a further
30 per cent (including landless, poor peasant and lower-middle peasant households) received
land, which was distributed on a per capita basis.4
As a result, inequalities in landownership and landlessness decreased precipitously in the
Mekong Delta by the mid-1980s (Ngo Vinh Long 1993, 183; Dao The Tuan 1997, 166); the
equalization process, moreover, was seen as a vital first step towards the eventual collectivization of agriculture, since each household would be able to enter into a cooperative on an
equal footing (Quang Truong 1987, 218–22). Despite efforts by the new authorities to gather
households into cooperative enterprises and to develop an ideology of ‘sharing rice and
clothing’ (nhuong com se ao) that cut across former class lines, such attempts were continuously
stymied by the persistence of peasant attachments to private property and market relations. In
4

Hy Van Luong (1994, 89) observes a similar ratio of contributors to beneficiaries in his study of Khanh Hau
village in Long An province. There, 100 upper-middle peasant households, or about 30 per cent of the village
population, were strongly ‘encouraged’ by local authorities to donate 1 hectare each of ‘surplus’ land to a further
100 landless and land-poor households.
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some cases, these extended to outright resistance to socialist reforms on the part of the upper
peasantry. Farmers, for example, slaughtered buffalo and oxen (rather than turn them over to
collectives), refused to harvest crops in time, destroyed fruit trees and rice fields, and sabotaged
collectively owned machinery (Quang Truong 1987, 267–8; Vo Nhan Tri 1990, 79; Porter
1993, 52–3).
The overwhelming irony of these redistributive reforms is that, in its attempt to expand
the ranks of landowning farmers, the government of Vietnam ran up against a moral
economy that emphasized the inviolability of existing property claims, rooted as they were in
regionally distinct histories of settlement, production and political mobilization. It was not just
the upper-middle and rich peasants, however, who attached a high value to notions of private
property. Some poor and landless peasants, for example, ‘refused to receive redistributed land’,
claiming instead that it was ‘weird to take other people’s property’ (Dang 2007, 120). In the
words of one poor peasant, ‘at the time of land readjustment, authorities offered me some
land but I did not accept. I thought that if I had land being taken to give to others, I would
feel sad’ (Dang 2007, 261).
Political Opportunity
That a grievance – a perceived violation of a particular set of normative principles – existed is
in itself insufficient to explain political mobilization to redress that grievance. Instead, the shift
from small-scale, everyday resistance by the farmers of the Mekong Delta to coordinated
social action of a type that might actually reverse the redistribution of land and achieve the
restitution of disputed plots to their former owners required a moment of political opportunity. A confluence of circumstances in the late 1980s – including a food crisis, a leadership
change and a moment of policy uncertainty – created such an opportunity, leading to an
unprecedented opening for social mobilization within the normally rigid confines of
Vietnam’s one-party political system.
By the 1980s, Vietnam’s planned economy was in the midst of a severe crisis, particularly
in regard to agricultural production. Although tentative reforms in 1981 had sought to
incentivize increased production by letting households keep and market agricultural surpluses
(that is, production that exceeded state requisition quotas), production had once again stagnated, particularly in the Mekong Delta (Ngo Vinh Long 1993, 174–5). Missed targets in the
south, traditionally a region of agricultural surplus, contributed to food insecurity in the
rice-deficient north: in the mid-1980s, some 40 per cent of the rural population in northern
Vietnam faced routine hunger, and by 1988, food shortages in the north placed an estimated
9.3 million people in danger of famine (Ngo Vinh Long 1993, 176). Food shortfalls also
raised the prospect of social unrest; Kerkvliet (2005, 208), for example, describes how hungry
peasants in the Red River Delta province of Ha Nam Ninh province stormed warehouses
and granaries in 1986. Faced with the loss of aid from its crumbling Eastern Bloc allies, the
leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party looked inward for the resolution to its mounting food security challenges; included in the proceedings of the Sixth Party Congress in 1986
was a resolution calling particular attention to the Mekong Delta as a vast reserve of untapped
agricultural potential and calling for a return to ‘commodity’ production in the region (Vo
Tong Xuan 1995, 192).
The Sixth Party Congress also marked the formal inauguration of an era of economic
reforms known collectively as Doi Moi, or ‘renovation’. These reforms had actually begun
much earlier, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as local cadres and provincial party leadership
had experimented with ‘fence breaking’ market reforms, sometimes risking the ire of the
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The Dynamics of Land Privatization in the Mekong Delta 511
central leadership by defying the party line (Dang and Beresford 1998). By the mid-1980s,
however, a new generation of reformists, such as Nguyen Van Linh (who served as General
Secretary of the Communist Party from 1986 to 1991) and Vo Van Kiet (Vietnam’s chief
economic planner for most of the 1980s and its Prime Minister in 1988, and again between
1991 to 1997), had risen to the chief leadership positions in the party-state. Significantly, both
Linh and Kiet had strong ties to the south; the former was a northerner by birth but had
served among the southern insurgents during the war, while the latter had been born and
raised in the Mekong Delta province of Vinh Long.
Under the leadership of Linh and Kiet, the pace of reform quickened, leading in 1988 to a
monumental reform of the agricultural sector, known as ‘Resolution 10’. Essentially, Resolution 10 marked the return of private ownership and production in Vietnamese agriculture,
calling for the dismantling of the agricultural collectives where they existed and for the
allocation of land to individual households for private farming. Households would then
receive long-term land use rights for these parcels, with the duration of those rights ranging
from 10 to 20 years (Pingali and Xuan 1992, 707). What Resolution 10 did not provide,
however, was set of specific guidelines as to how land was to be reallocated. That is, it neither
called for the formalization of the relatively egalitarian distribution of land that existed in the
aftermath of the ‘readjustments’ of the early 1980s nor outlined an alternative mechanism by
which land rights were to be assigned; instead, it relegated such decisions to the provincial
and sub-provincial authorities (FBIS 18 May 1988).
The uncertainty around Resolution 10 presented an immediate opportunity for aggrieved
landowners in the Mekong Delta to organize in pursuit of restitutional reforms, while the
background of the new party leadership and the dire food security situation that they faced
created a climate receptive to such demands. The argument advanced here is thus not that the
relatively well-off farmers of the Mekong Delta brought about or caused market reforms in
Vietnam, which were already well under way by 1988, but that they took advantage of a
structural opportunity to mobilize and frame their demands for land restitution in a manner
that resonated with a set of widely held, but regionally specific, normative values around
landownership. In doing so, they profoundly shaped the manner in which land was distributed
in the Mekong Delta, setting in motion a process of agricultural commercialization during
the post-socialist period.

CASE STUDIES: THE POLITICS OF LAND PRIVATIZATION
To an extent and scale never before seen in post-war Vietnam, upper-peasant protestors
engaged, over the summer and autumn of 1988, in open, organized and vocal acts of contentious politics, ranging from petition drives to direct confrontations with government officials,
all with the aim of recovering lost holdings.5 In many cases, farmers marched on government
offices at the provincial, district and commune levels to demand the restitution of their old
land (Thayer 1992, 354); in Hau Giang province, for example, protestors from Vinh Chau and
Thanh Tri districts came to Can Tho, the provincial capital, to submit petitions on land
disputes during the summer (BHG 10 August 1988), and farmers in Cuu Long province are
reported to have marched on the provincial capital of Vinh Long to protest injustices in the
5

As Trung Dinh Dang (2007, 316–17) points out, there were also many cases of corrupt local cadres who had
used the land redistribution process to appropriate land for themselves and their families; thus, an additional and
overlapping set of social conflicts in the late 1980s pitted middle peasants against the local party cadres now
occupying their former plots.
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Figure 1 The regions of Vietnam (left) and the provinces of the Mekong Delta, c.1988 (right)

allocation of land on 11 October (Hiebert 1989, 19). In some cases, former owners simply
reoccupied disputed plots and forcibly displaced their current inhabitants, but the most
common course of action was to file a petition for land restitution. In total, at least 200,000
petitions were lodged with the central government, with the largest number of petitions
coming from the Mekong Delta provinces of An Giang, Dong Thap and Minh Hai (JPRS 15
April 1992) (for a map of the Mekong Delta’s provinces in 1988, see Figure 1).
The protestors themselves were a relatively heterogeneous group, ranging from slightly
above-average middle peasants to relatively affluent rich peasants. What makes the concept of
moral economy sociologically interesting, however, was the means by which a common moral
framing with broad social purchase – rooted in the experiences and historical aspirations of
the region’s new landowners, many of whom were former tenants – was used to collapse
boundaries between agrarian classes, allowing for middle and rich peasants to unite around
common notions of property and propriety and to neutralize opposition (from below) and
curry support (from above). Using a mix of newspaper accounts and secondary sources, I have
constructed below a series of case studies that illustrate the ways in which these protestors
drew upon and articulated a moral economy of property with broad social legitimacy in order
to press claims against the state and other social actors, including the rural poor now occupying their former holdings.
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Although these accounts differ in their particularities, they are linked, first, by the interlocking arguments that protestors draw upon to make claims to property, as those interviewed
or cited frequently link land claims to notions of cultivation, diligence and hard work. Some,
for example, cite the poor productive capacity of the land’s current occupiers as justification
for their displacement, while others point to the wetlands of the western frontier, arguing that
the landless should not take what belongs to others when they can still settle and clear such
‘wild’ lands. Other protestors engaged in the symbolic clearance and cultivation of disputed
plots to shore up their claims. In addition, land claimants frequently invoked their revolutionary service and labour, emphasizing the historical link between the land reforms of the NLF
and the class aspirations of the new landowning class. In some cases, protestors sometimes
went so far as to brandish war medals as they marched on government buildings (Thayer
1992).
Common themes also emerge in the way in which others responded to these claims, often
echoing or acceding to the normative concepts articulated by the aggrieved landowners. First,
although sources tell of conflict between land claimants and the current occupiers of disputed
parcels – mostly poor and formerly landless peasants – there is also evidence that some of
those who lost or stood to lose their land acknowledged the legitimacy of land claims by
former owners and willingly vacated plots out of deference to shared notions of justice or
propriety. Second, those local officials who were called on to mediate land disputes often
came down on the side of upper-peasant land claimants, in the process articulating a reformist, pro-market discourse that explicitly linked landownership with the capacity of farmers to
engage in ‘commodity production’ (san xuat hang hoa) (FBIS 15 November 1988).
Example 1: Tien Giang Province
In a story carried by the AFP in November 1988, a farmer in Tien Giang province by the
name of Chu Duc Danh was interviewed by journalist Jean-Claude Chapon (FBIS 25
November 1988). Before 1975, Chu Duc Danh was relatively affluent, owning 9 hectares of
agricultural land. With the coming of communist rule in 1975, he distributed 7 hectares to his
children, keeping two for himself. In 1983, the local government took 1 hectare and distributed it to a landless household. In the summer of 1988, however, he reoccupied the land
himself. The village officials declined to intervene, and the family he evicted became landless
once again.
In the interview, he justifies his unilateral act by appealing both to his revolutionary service
and to an ethos of hard work. ‘During the war,’ he argues, ‘I paid a tax to the resistance and I
aided the liberation front. I sacrificed my life for independence and it was unfair to take my
land from me. I have taken back what belongs to me.’ The land, moreover, he says, is already
under cultivation in rice and cucumbers, as if to further solidify his claim. As for the peasant
he displaced, he says dismissively, ‘there are plenty of more lands that can be cleared’.
Source: Agence France-Presse via FBIS.
Example 2: Ben Tre Province
An Hiep commune, Ben Tre province, as profiled in the Tuoi Tre newspaper in the autumn of
1988 (TT 26 November 1988), had initially been at the forefront of the collectivization
movement; when a collective farm was created there in 1979, 95 per cent of the households
in the area participated. In 1982, however, land was redistributed to individual households on
an egalitarian basis: not only were total holdings apportioned on the basis of household size,
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but the individual plots were allocated through the drawing of lots, to ensure that no one
family was favoured with better-quality or more easily accessible land. Because of this egalitarian reform, however, production land was ‘mixed up’ (xao canh) between families, and
people were ‘working the land of others’ (canh tac ruong cua nguoi khac).
In 1988, farmers began requesting their old land back, and hundreds protested at the
Commune People’s Committee office to demand the restitution of their former holdings (keo
len uy ban xa xin ve dat cu). The local government eventually acquiesced to their demands, but
the resolution of these land claims left 15 households in the commune without any land to
farm. To rectify this situation, the commune arranged for their relocation to the province of
Dong Thap, in the Plain of Reeds, where land could still be cleared and settled, promising
them between 5,000 and 7,000 square metres per person.
Source: Tuoi Tre newspaper.
Example 3: Binh Chanh, Ho Chi Minh City
Emboldened by news that the government in neighbouring Long An province was returning
land to its former owners, farmers in Binh Chanh, a rural commune on the south-western
edge of Ho Chi Minh City, began demanding the restitution of their former plots in the
summer of 1988 (TT 12 July 1988). In total, 108 farmers filed petitions to reclaim land, while
19 former landowners simply seized their old plots. Local officials intervened to mediate these
disputes, convincing eight beneficiaries of the readjustment campaigns to return their plots to
former owners because they ‘were not making a good living’, and were in arrears to the
commune government over taxes and missed quotas. In total, these eight households returned
a total of 1.63 hectares of agricultural land to former owners, who were characterized as
‘good producers’.
One of these petitioners, Mr Nguyen Van Hai, is profiled at length in Tuoi Tre. Hai owned
more than 6.5 hectares before 1975, but was forced to surrender all but 1.7 hectares under
the redistribution campaigns. While this still left him and his family substantially above the
average per capita landownership in the commune, he instead decided to reoccupy an additional 1.3 hectares, now cultivated by three families. With the intervention of the commune
authorities, it was decided to split the disputed land between Hai and its current cultivators;
special consideration was given to Hai’s claim, the newspaper states, because he ‘is a good
farmer, and has served as an exemplar for others for quite some time, and always fulfils his
obligation to the nation in a straightforward manner’.
In a separate interview, a local official explains that, ‘if we continue to distribute the land in
an equal manner, like we did before, everyone will be poor, everyone will lack work’. A
‘household that can farm well can, by itself, cultivate 2–3 hectares of double-cropped rice per
year’, and thus the policy of the local government is to ‘encourage those who are not skilled
at rice farming to transfer their land back to those who know how to farm’ (TT 25 June
1988).
Source: Tuoi Tre newspaper.
Example 4: Hau Giang Province
In the autumn of 1988, reporters from the Thanh Nien newspaper accompanied Party Secretary Le Phuoc Tho, a top government official tasked with resolving land disputes in the
Mekong Delta, to Phuoc Thoi commune in Hau Giang province, where they gathered the
stories of land petitioners. Many in the area had been forced to surrender 75–80 per cent of
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their land holdings in the redistribution campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
many were now demanding their return; by November 1988, 285 petitions had been submitted by former owners, 95 of whom had directly reoccupied their former holdings without
waiting for a resolution of their claims (TN 21 November 1988).
One farmer, a Mr Nguyen Van Du, cited revolutionary service in support of his petition
for land restitution, arguing that his ‘family sacrificed two people and our home was destroyed
in the war, and once liberation was accomplished we stood at the head of every campaign’.
Now, however, his 2.1 hectare holding had been whittled down in successive redistributions
to only 0.88 hectares, which was ‘not enough even to eat’. Another farmer, Mr Nguyen Van
Thong, lost a little over a half a hectare of land, which was redistributed to a ‘drunk’, whose
harvests failed and who eventually fell behind in his quota obligations before (informally)
renting the land to another person.
As farmer Tran Van Hai explains, those middle and upper-middle peasants who lost land
‘only had a few thousand square metres; there was no excess’. While ‘capitalists in the cities
have big houses and cars’, he argues, ‘farmers just have land, the means of production’. He
goes on to explain that he and his fellow protestors ‘just want to have our land returned to
us’, even if doing so entails the displacement of others.
Source: Thanh Nien newspaper.
Example 5: An Giang Province
In Trung Dinh Dang’s (2007) case study area of Cho Moi district, An Giang province, the
late 1980s are still known as the ‘great turmoil’ (dao lon); after Resolution 10 was issued in
1988, former owners rushed to claim their old lands, some negotiating with current cultivators, others simply seizing land and sowing new rice crops on it, and others gathering at the
commune and district offices to make their case to local officials. As one former owner, who
had cultivated 6 hectares before 1975, recalled, ‘after reunification, revolutionary authorities
took all my land to redistribute to others. They took my land right out of my hands’ (Dang
2007, 308). Now, however, he had the ‘chance to take it back’. After the authorities rejected
his initial request for land restitution, he explains, ‘I decided to break the law; my two
brothers and I brought them machetes to the field to work. I said that if he [the hamlet chief]
came to the field, we would kill him. I said that it was right for the authorities to take
abandoned land but not right to steal land from people’ (Dang 2007, 308). With the intervention of the hamlet chief, he soon regained his former holdings.
Despite the threat of violence, however, many land-reform beneficiaries whom Trung Dinh
Dang interviewed returned land out of an apparent deference to the ‘rights of individual land
ownership and values of justice’ (2007, 308). In the words of one landless labourer, who
returned a parcel of land to its former owner in 1988, ‘the land had to be returned to its
owner. It was odd to take another person’s land. Everyone did the same. If we were poor, we
accepted that; we should not steal someone else’s land (giut dat nguoi khac) to make a living’
(Dang 2007, 309).
Source: Dang (2007).
By the late summer and early autumn of 1988, these local conflicts over land had been scaled
up to the level of national politics, culminating in two marches in Ho Chi Minh City, in
which hundreds of upper-peasant protestors from the Mekong Delta engaged in an unprecedented display of overt political protest, aimed at pressuring representatives of the central
government into intervening on their behalf in local land disputes (Doan Ket 1988, 44; SGGP
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11 November 1988; Hiebert 1989, 19). These manifestations of agrarian discontent, moreover,
came at a time of similarly unprecedented contestation and mobilization within the Vietnamese political sphere, as a ‘creeping pluralism’ pushed the boundaries of the one-party model
(Porter 1993). At the same time as the Mekong Delta’s middle and rich peasants were taking
to the street, an intra-party battle over the direction and pace of reform was breaking into the
public realm, leading to the emergence of external pressure groups, independent of the
communist establishment, which aimed to influence the policy debate. The most notable of
these (ultimately short-lived) groups was the ‘Club of Former Resistance Fighters’ (Cau lac bo
Nhung Nguoi Khang chien cu); comprised of NLF veterans from the former South Vietnam, the
Club pushed for economic reforms and more political openness (Abuza 2001, 161–82).
The mere fact that such open protests were not immediately suppressed speaks to both the
relative weakness of the central state in the late 1980s and to the emergence of affinities
between reform-orientated politicians and organized pressure groups, such as the veterans and
upper peasants (Wain 1989; Thayer 1992). In the case of the upper peasantry, this combination
of external pressure and converging political interests resulted, eventually, in the promulgation
of a specific set of reforms, contained within a policy document known as Directive 47,
which was applicable only to the Mekong Delta and which called for the restitution of land,
in most cases, to its former owners. Such a move, in the language of the decree, would form
the first step towards the ultimate reorganization of agricultural production in the Mekong
Delta ‘along the line of intensive cultivation, multicropping’ and ‘comprehensive business
development’ (FBIS 15 November 1988).
In official rhetoric, this decision to side with the semi-commercial upper peasant was
framed in a way that justified inequalities in both outcomes and in initial land endowments
by reference to ‘hard work’ and productive capacity. While General Secretary Nguyen Van
Linh described agricultural reform as encouraging ‘farmers to make full use of their capacity
. . . to develop production and to both increase output for society and raise their own
incomes’, he acknowledged that doing so would produce ‘some households that are well-off,
and which have a standard of living which is higher than other households’ (BHG 20 April
1988). In the spring of 1989, a local newspaper in the Mekong Delta articulated a similar
argument in relation to land allocation, editorializing that there was no need to ‘jealously
guard equality between households’, since it was only fair for households that were ‘diligent in
their work’ to be allocated more than ‘those who are lazy’ (BHG 12 April 1989).
Although the resolution of land disputes in the Mekong Delta took several years, concluding only in the mid-1990s, disputes were generally resolved in the favour of previous (pre1975) owners (Lam Quang Huyen 1997, 175), in line with official policies outlined in Decree
47. Fieldwork by Le Coq and Trebuil (2005, 537) in Hau Giang province confirms that ‘land
was redistributed to farmers according to the land ownership situation before collectivization’,
conforming roughly to the distribution that prevailed after the ‘land to the tiller’ reforms of
the early 1970s, while work by Luong Hong Quang (1997, 116–22) in Tien Giang finds a
similar pattern of restitution. As one farmer in An Giang recalled to Trung Dinh Dang, ‘thanks
to Mr. Linh, I could retrieve half of my land and a plowing machine. I was very happy when
I took it back. People should worship Mr. Linh!’ (2007, 309).
In the Mekong Delta, the consequence of restitutional policies – in conjunction with the
loosening of restraints on the private ownership and trade of not just land, but other agricultural inputs and outputs – was to prompt the rapid re-emergence of a stratum of capitalist
farmers, setting the scene for a new wave of accumulation within the agricultural sector. In
An Giang and Hau Giang provinces, it was reported that, by late 1988 ‘many farmers’ were
farming plots of 10 hectares or more (BHG 21 December 1988 and 18 January 1989), and
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similar re-accumulation was also reported in Long An, where some farmers received up to 9
hectares of restituted land (Luong 1994, 102). Many of these larger farmers already had
substantial mechanized inputs at their disposal, and in the areas where the means of production had been collectivized, the dissolution of agricultural cooperatives often meant that their
productive stock – tractors and other farm implements – were sold at auction to the highest
bidder, allowing the relatively well-off to complement their land holdings with other factors
of production and to cement their social and economic position.
By 1993, nearly half of farming households in the Mekong Delta were producing exclusively (or almost exclusively) for the market (Dao The Tuan 1997). The process of land
privatization led, however, not only led to the creation of a new class of upwardly mobile
owner–operators, but also to the rapid re-emergence of a stratum of landless and land-poor
rural workers (Nguyen Dinh Huong 1999, 130). Survey data collected in 1992–3 (as part of
the first iteration of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey), shows that the rate of landlessness
in the Mekong Delta already stood at approximately 16 per cent, while the Gini index for
agricultural landownership was 0.51, much higher than anywhere else in Vietnam (Brandt
2006, table 5).6 Not only did the region demonstrate significant polarization in landownership, but it also had the highest level of reported income inequality in Vietnam, and the
highest level of food insecurity (Dao The Tuan 1997). Thus, social polarization is evident
even at a very early stage after the resolution of land disputes, a sign that such polarization
derived not from the unleashing of ‘market forces’, but from the process by which land and
other assets were allocated.
These inequalities intensified in the post-reform period, as those landowning farmers
endowed with the ‘resources with which to respond to favourable market conditions’ were
able to expand and accumulate (Ngo Vinh Long 1993, 184; Dang Phong 1995). As Prota and
Beresford (2012) argue, access to land has been a necessary, but not sufficient, means of
achieving upward social mobility among peasant producers in the Mekong Delta; those who
were not allocated land in the privatization process (or had their holdings taken away from
them for restitution to former owners), they find, were far more likely than their counterparts
to experience negative social mobility. Among those who experienced partial, but not complete dispossession as a result of the restitution process, the results have been similar. As Le
Coq and Trebuil (2005, 539) find, those who entered the 1990s with very small holdings
encountered difficulties in achieving financial viability and in competing with their larger
counterparts, eventually leading to a spiral of debt and distress sale, thus accelerating the trend
of accumulation and swelling the ranks of the landless. By the 2000s, the landless accounted
for over 25 per cent of the rural population, and largely derived their income from precarious
seasonal employment on commercial farms (Brandt 2006, table 5).
In other regions of Vietnam, most notably the Red River Delta in the north, the land
privatization process was instead much more highly egalitarian, due in part to the mobilization of peasants around a very different moral economy of property. In the Red River Delta,
local authorities initially attempted, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to induce greater
productivity in agriculture through an auction-based land allocation process that would favour
better-off households. Such efforts, however, were resisted by the ranks of the poor and
lower-middle peasants, who through complaints and collective pressure induced local cadres
6

These figures do not, moreover, capture the large number of poor peasants dispossessed in their villages of
origin and relocated by provincial governments to remote areas on the agricultural frontier, namely the Plain of
Reeds in Dong Thap province. According to Hy Van Luong (1994, 102), as many of 400 landless households
were relocated to Dong Thap from one small area of Long An province.
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to adopt a more egalitarian, per capita distribution strategy (Dang Canh Khanh 1991, 348).
Ngo Vinh Long (1993, 198), for example, describes how peasants in the Red River Delta
‘refused to allow wealthy households to bid for contracts on even the most infertile land on
the grounds that doing so would aid the rich and thereby “violate the principles of social
justice” ’.
Rather than being thrust into increasingly capitalist relations of agricultural production, as
were their counterparts in the south, nearly all farming households in the Red River Delta
thus entered the post-reform period with at least a small amount of agricultural land ‘capable
of providing even the poorest with a modicum of economic security and a sort of subsistence
safety net’ during a time of upheaval and uncertainty (Watts 1998, 483). As Rambo and Le
(1991, 88–91) put it, ‘farmers will not get rich from these lands, but at least they are
guaranteed a source of livelihood that more or less adequately provides for their family’s
sustenance’. In sharp contrast to the Mekong Delta, the bifurcation of agrarian classes into
large-scale producers and agrarian wage labourers has been virtually non-existent in the Red
River Delta. For example, Luong (2010, 223–4) reports that in his study site in Phu Tho
province, no ‘villager had to rely exclusively or primarily on selling his/her labour to agricultural employers’, since farmers were instead ‘guaranteed some land for their livelihood’.
CONCLUSION
What I have provided above is an account of how particular moral economies are shaped by
historical relations of settlement, production and political struggle, and how these moral
economies in turn foster collective social action, rendering it meaningful to individual participants and directing it towards certain ends. In doing so, I have hewn closely to Thompson’s
original formulation of the ‘moral economy’, drawing as well on Wolford’s examination of
moral economy in its relation to agrarian movements in contemporary Brazil. In particular, I
have followed Wolford in conceptualizing ‘moral economy’ as the ‘moral arguments’, embedded in particular histories and social relations, that are used by groups to make claims to
productive resources and outline the ideal distribution of those resources.
By tracing the origins and articulation of a particular moral economy of property, one
situated within the experiences of the Mekong Delta’s emergent class of capitalist farmers, I
have identified one of the key factors behind that region’s rapid resumption of commercial
agriculture in the post-reform period and its divergence from other regions, such as the Red
River Delta. In drawing this comparison between the process of land privatization in the
Mekong and Red River Deltas, I have also highlighted the interplay between moral economy
and political economy. While research (Sikor 2004; McElwee 2007; Hy Van Luong 2010)
suggests that normative commitments to egalitarianism, risk minimization and reciprocal obligation are widely held in northern Vietnamese communities, and that these commitments
have helped re-create a peasant form of subsistence-orientated agriculture in this region, the
existence of a very different moral economy in the Mekong Delta has instead given rise to a
more skewed distribution of land, and thus laid the groundwork for the rapid re-emergence
of agrarian capitalism.
The divergence between north and south, and the particular path that the Mekong Delta
has taken towards technologically intensive, large-scale export agriculture, are thus rooted not
in the imposition of ‘markets’ per se, but in the structural and normative landscape in which
market reforms have been interpreted, contested and implemented. In this way, the conflicts
over land that occurred in the Mekong Delta during the late 1980s did not just help to create
the material conditions for agrarian capitalism, but the normative and ideational conditions
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under which it could thrive. By ensuring the restitution of land to its former owners and by
cementing a particular moral economy of property within the political economy of the
Mekong Delta, these conflicts helped to entrench neoliberal notions that land rightly belongs
to those who can most effectively till it, and to shape the state’s role as the protector of
property rights, rather than the guarantor of a subsistence minimum. In this way, the moral
economy of the upper peasantry provided the foundation upon which a new set of economic
and political relations were constructed in the post-socialist period.
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